Abstract-We consider the problem of verifying the security of finitely many sessions of a protocol that tosses coins in addition to standard cryptographic primitives against a DolevYao adversary. Two properties are investigated here -secrecy, which asks if no adversary interacting with a protocol P can determine a secret sec with probability > 1 − p; and indistinguishability, which asks if the probability observing any sequence o in P1 is the same as that of observing o in P2, under the same adversary. Both secrecy and indistinguishability are known to be coNP-complete for non-randomized protocols. In contrast, we show that, for randomized protocols, secrecy and indistinguishability are both decidable in coNEXPTIME. We also prove a matching lower bound for the secrecy problem by reducing the non-satisfiability problem of monadic first order logic without equality.
Introduction
Randomization is used in security protocols to achieve security guarantees such as anonymity (see for example dining cryptographers [1] , Crowds [2] and onion routing [3] ) and voter privacy in electronic voting (see for example [4] ). Automated techniques to formally analyze security protocols are necessary because the design of such protocols is subtle and error-prone. While there has been a lot of work on understanding the computational difficulty of verifying security protocols that do not employ randomness, very little is known when it comes to randomized security protocols; this paper aims to address this void. We consider the problem of verifying security for randomized protocols with a bounded number of sessions. The reason for considering only bounded number of sessions is because it is well known that secrecy is undecidable for non-randomized protocols, in general [5] , [6] , [7] .
The usefulness of a formal analysis crucially depends on a judicious delineation of the powers of an adversary. Given the success of the "Dolev-Yao" adversary model and perfect cryptography in non-probabilistic protocols, we make similar assumptions here. Thus protocol participants send and receive messages over public channel controlled by an omnipotent adversary who tosses coins, reads all messages sent on the channel, and can inject new messages into the network as well. The adversarial behavior can depend on the entire communication transcript, but the adversary cannot decrypt messages whose key (s)he is not aware of. However, in the presence of coin tossing steps taken by the protocol, new subtleties need to be accounted for. As many researchers have recently observed [8] , [9] , [10] , [11] , [12] , it is essential that the protocol coin tosses remain private to the protocol participants. In the absence of such guarantees, the analysis can reveal "flaws" where none exist (see examples in [8] , [9] , [10] , [11] , [12] ).
In order to faithfully model private coin tosses, we follow [13] and our protocol semantics is described using (infinite-branching) partially observable Markov decision processes (POMDPs). POMDPs are often used as models of randomized, nondeterministic systems where some systems states are indistinguishable to a scheduler/adversary, who resolves the process nondeterminism. Indistinguishability among states is captured by an equivalence relation on states, and the assumption that the scheduler/adversary only observes the equivalence class of states, and not the actual states, during a computation. In our formalism, each state of the POMDP consists of the state of the protocol principals (that doesn't include the result of coin tosses) and the frame, the state of the adversary (i.e., the messages received by the adversary). The nondeterminism models the actions of an adversary who chooses both the next message and its recipient. For equivalence of states, we use static equivalence [14] . The adversary must take the same action in two executions with the same view. The view of an execution is the sequence of the equivalence classes of the states and the adversary actions in the execution. Our notion of indistinguishability of views coincides with the traceindistinguishability of applied-pi calculus processes [14] .
Our Contributions. In this paper we establish the complexity of checking two properties of randomized protocols, namely, secrecy, and indistinguishability. The secrecy problem asks, given a bounded number of sessions of a randomized protocol, a secret name sec, and probability threshold p, is it the case that no adversary learns the secret sec with probability > (1 − p)? Our first result is that this secrecy problem is decidable in coNEXPTIME for randomized protocols.
We outline the ideas behind establishing this decidability result. Recall that the secrecy problem for non-probabilistic protocols with bounded sessions is coNP-complete [15] , [6] . This result for non-probabilistic protocols is established by observing that in the "smallest" attack, any message sent by the adversary is either a subterm of a message received by the adversary (i.e., sent by a protocol participant), or is constructed by a composition of such subterms. Moreover, if the adversary ever composes subterms of messages (s)he sends, then the constructed message must match (ie, unify with) a non-variable subterm of the protocol of the protocol description. This results in observing that the sizes of messages (when encoded as dags), sent in a smallest attack, are linear in the protocol size and gives an NP algorithm to prove insecurity. Unfortunately, these observations no longer hold in the case of randomized protocols. In Example 5.1 on Page 10, we show that there are randomized protocols for which the adversary must send exponential-sized messages in order to break secrecy.
While the strong guarantees of message terseness that hold for non-probabilistic protocols are no longer true, we demonstrate that weaker properties do hold. We show that in the smallest attack, the adversary constructs a new composed message only if in an "equivalent" trace (from the perspective of the adversary's view), the corresponding composed message matches a subterm of the protocol description. This gives us an exponential upper bound on message sizes in the smallest attack, yielding an NEXPTIME algorithm to demonstrate insecurity.
Next we prove that this upper bound is optimal, i.e., we show that the secrecy problem is coNEXPTIME-hard. We establish this result by reducing the non-satisfiability problem for monadic first order logic without equality, which is known to be coNEXPTIME-complete [16] . There are three key ideas that play a role in establishing this result. The first is an observation due to Rusinowitch and Turuani [15] that shows how the satisfiability of propositional logic can be reduced to protocol insecurity. The second observation is that randomization can be used to simulate quantifier alternation, with the adversary making existential choices, and the protocol making universal choices by probabilistic steps. The last ingredient needed is the ability of a randomized protocol to "examine" the contents of an exponential sized message, which underlies the ideas in Example 5.1 on Page 10.
We also consider the problem of checking indistinguishability of two randomized protocols. We say that two protocols P and P are indistinguishable if for each adversary A and view o, the sum of probability of executions of P under A with the view o is the same as sum of probability of executions of P under A with the view o. We show that the indistinguishability problem for randomized protocols is decidable in coNEXPTIME for randomized protocols. This is achieved once again by bounding the size of the recipes in a bounded attack. We observe that the protocols in our formalism are simple; a protocol is said to be simple if there is no principal-level nondeterminism. As a consequence, our notion of indistinguishability coincides with the notion of trace-equivalence for simple non-probabilistic protocols [17] . This is because in a simple, non-probabilistic protocol, for each view o, there can be only one execution with the view o.
Our last observation is a fixed-parameter complexity result for the secrecy and the indistinguishability problems: if we fix the number of coin tosses but not the number of protocol steps or the size of protocol terms, the secrecy and indistinguishability problems are coNPcomplete. This generalizes the results for checking secrecy of non-probabilistic security protocols, and for checking indistinguishability of simple non-probabilistic protocols [17] , which are protocols that fix the number of coin tosses to 0.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. The syntax of the protocols is presented in Section 2 and the semantics in Section 3. The upper bounds for complexity results are presented in Section 4 and lower bounds in Section 5. We conclude in Section 6. For lack of space, several proofs are omitted and can be found in [18] . All the results of the paper, together with the earlier results on non-randomized protocols, are given in Table 1 on Page 11.
Related Work. For (non-randomized) security protocols, secrecy was shown to be undecidable in [5] , [6] , [7] , although decidability can be obtained for certain subclasses. For bounded number of sessions, secrecy was shown to be coNP-complete in [15] , [6] .
For indistinguishability (equivalence) properties of (nonrandomized) security protocols, undecidability is shown in [19] . For bounded number of sessions, decidability is established in [19] , [20] , [21] , [17] , [22] , [23] , [24] . While [19] , [21] , [22] , [23] allow only a limited set of cryptographic primitives (symmetric and asymmetric encryption and cryptographic hash), [20] , [21] , [17] , [24] allow cryptographic primitives modeled as subterm convergent rewrite systems [25] . Furthermore, if the protocols are determinate then the decision problem is also coNP-complete. Determinate protocols are a generalization of simple protocols described above. [23] is the only decision procedure to consider negative tests, i.e., else branches and non-determinate processes. The complexity of the decision problem for nondeterminate protocols remain open.
There are a number of tools that check for security in the non-randomized setting; examples include, Maude-NPA [26] , ProverIf [27] , AVISPA [28] , APTE [22] , [23] , Scyther [29] , Tamarin [30] and AKiSs [31] .
Protocol syntax
We assume the reader is familiar with probability spaces. The set of all discrete measures on a set S will be denoted by Dist(S). The support of a measure µ ∈ Dist(S) is the set {s ∈ S | µ(s) > 0}. We will assume that for each µ ∈ Dist(S) the support of µ is finite. As usual, the set of finite sequences over A will be denoted by A * .
Terms, substitutions and frames
Terms. We assume a countable set Pub of public names, and a disjoint countable set Prv of private names that will model secret nonces and secret keys that a protocol participant may use. We assume that there is a countable subset PrivKeys ⊂ Prv which will model private asymmetric encryption keys. We assume that there is a countable set PublicKeys ⊂ Pub which will model public asymmetric encryption keys. Furthermore, we assume that there is a bijection −1 : PublicKeys → PrivKeys which maps public keys to their corresponding private decryption keys. We use pk, pk 1 , . . . to range over public encryption keys. For a public encryption key pk, the corresponding private key will be denoted by pk −1 . We also assume that the sets Prv \ PrivKeys and Pub \ PublicKeys are countably infinite.
We assume two sets of function symbols; a set F c of constructor function symbols and a set F d of destructor function symbols. The set F c consists of binary function symbols senc, aenc and the pairing function [·, ·] . The set F d consists of binary function symbols sdec, adec and unary function symbols proj 1 and proj 2 . senc/sdec will model symmetric encryption/decryption and aenc/adec will model asymmetric encryption/decryption. We assume a countable set of protocol variables X and a disjoint countable set X w of frame variables. X will be used as variables in the protocol description, while X w will be used to refer to messages received by the adversary. We assume that there is a fixed enumeration {w 1 , w 2 , . . . , } of variables in X w .
Given a set of names N ⊆ Pub ∪ Prv, a set of function symbols F ⊆ F c ∪ F d and a set of variables X ⊆ X ∪ X w , the set of terms built using F, N and X is defined as usual. The subterms of a term t are defined as usual. We will say that a term t is well-formed if for each term t 1 , t 2 , whenever aenc(t 1 , t 2 ) is a subterm of t then t 1 ∈ PublicKeys. The set of well-formed terms built using F, N and X will be denoted by T (F, N, X). As is the case in [15] , for the rest of the paper, we will assume that all terms are well-formed 1 . We use Sub(t) to denote the set of subterms of t and Sub(T ) to denote the set of subterms of a set of terms T . We will write t t if t is a subterm of t and t t if t t and t = t . The set of variables occurring in a term is denoted by vars(t). The set of names occurring in a term will be denoted by names(t). A ground term is one that has no variables appearing in it. We identify the following abbreviations for sets of terms:
will be denoted by T erms.
• The set T (F c , Pub ∪ Prv, X ) of constructor terms will be denoted by CT erms.
• The set T (F c ∪ F d , Pub, X w ) of recipes will be denoted by Recipes.
Any term t can be viewed as a node-labeled and ordered finite tree, with nodes labeled by either a function symbol, or a name, or a variable. Leaves are labeled by either a name or a variable. Internal nodes are labeled by function symbols, with the number of children being determined by the arity of the function symbol. The edges from an internal node to its children are assumed to be numbered sequentially from left to right starting from one; these numbers are considered as the labels of the edges. Now, the position of each node of t can be uniquely represented by the sequence of the labels of the edges on the path from the root to the node, with the root node being represented by the empty sequence. We let t|p denote the subterm of t represented by the subtree of t rooted at position p. We also let positions(t) denote the set of positions of nodes of t. By the height of a term, denoted height(t), we mean the height of the tree representing t; the height of a tree with one node being taken to be 0. Size of a term t is defined to be the size of the tree representing t, i.e., the number of nodes in the tree representing t.
Any term t can also be represented as a node-labeled directed acyclic graph (dag) dag(t) [15] , [25] . Each node of t is labeled by either a function symbol or a name or a variable. If a node is labeled by a name or a variable then its out-degree is 0. If it is labeled by a function symbol f then its out-degree is the arity of the function symbol f , and its outgoing edges are assumed to be numbered sequentially from 1 to the arity of the function symbol f . Every node n of dag(t) represents a sub-term of t. If the node is labeled by a name (variable respectively) then it represents this name (variable respectively). If n is labeled by a function symbol f of arity n then it represents the term f (t 1 , . . . , t n ) where t i is the term represented by the node n i such that the edge from n to n i is numbered i. Furthermore, we assume that the distinct nodes of dag(t) represent different subterms of t. The dag-size of t is assumed to be the number of vertices of dag(t) and is the number of distinct subterms of t.
We assume that cryptographic operations are modeled via the means of a convergent rewriting system R on T erms. The set R consists of
For t ∈ T erms, nf(t) denotes the normal form obtained by rewriting t using R. We write
We also say that a term t is valid, denoted valid(t), if nf(u) ∈ CT erms for any subterm u of t.
Substitutions.
A substitution σ is a function that maps variables to terms. The set dom(σ) = {x ∈ X ∪ X w | σ(x) = x} is said to be the domain of the substitution σ. For the rest of the paper, each substitution will have a finite domain. A substitution σ with domain {x 1 , ..., x k } will be denoted as
The set {t 1 , .., t k } will be denoted by ran(σ). A substitution σ is said to be ground if every term in ran(σ) is ground and valid if every term in ran(σ) is valid. A substitution with empty domain will be denoted as ∅. A substitution can be extended to terms in the usual way. We write tσ for the term obtained by applying the substitution σ to the term t.
Two terms t 1 , t 2 are said to be unifiable if there exists a substitution σ such that t 1 σ = t 2 σ; here σ is said to be the unifier of t 1 and t 2 . We write mgu(t 1 , t 2 ) for the most general unifier for t 1 , t 2 . For the rest of the paper, we assume that substitutions are in normal form, i.e., for each x ∈ dom(σ), nf(σ(x)) = σ(x). Given two substitutions σ 1 and σ 2 such that dom(σ 1 ) ∩ dom(σ 2 ) = ∅, we write σ 1 ∪ σ 2 as the unique substitution whose domain is dom(σ 1 )∪dom(σ 2 ) and
Frames. Intuitively, a frame represents the sequence of messages obtained by the adversary. Formally, a frame ϕ is a ground and valid substitution such that dom(ϕ) ⊆ X w and dom(ϕ) = {w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w |dom(ϕ)| }. The set of frames will be denoted by F rames. ϕ(w i ) denotes the ith message received by the adversary. For a frame ϕ with dom(ϕ) = {w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w n } and a ground term t in normal form, ϕ t will denote the frame ϕ such that |dom(ϕ )| = n + 1 and
Intuitively, a term t is deducible if the adversary can compute it using the messages it has received and public names. A valid ground term t in normal form is deducible from a frame ϕ with a recipe r ∈ Recipes, denoted ϕ r t if vars(r) ⊆ dom(ϕ), valid(rϕ) and nf(rϕ) = t.
Intuitively, two frames are considered statically equivalent if the adversary cannot distinguish them. An adversary tries to distinguish two frames by performing tests. There are two kinds of tests, one for validity of recipes and the second for equality of recipes. Formally, two frames ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 are said to be statically equivalent,
For each recipe r with vars(r) ⊆ dom(ϕ 1 ), valid(rϕ 1 ) iff valid(rϕ 2 ), and
•
For each pair of recipes r, r such that
Our definition is inspired from [14] and follows more recent definitions, for example [32] . Example 2.1. Let k be a private name and let 0 and 1 be two distinct public names. Consider the two frames ϕ = {w 1 → senc(k, 0)} and ϕ = {w 1 → senc(k, 1)}. These two frames are statically equivalent even though the adversary has different terms. Intuitively, this is because the adversary cannot decrypt the ciphertext. On the other hand, the two frames
Protocols
We define protocols as a finite set of communicating roles. A role models the actions of one participant in one instance of the protocol and all communication is assumed to be mediated by the adversary. Each role performs a finite number of actions. In each action of the protocol participant, the participant receives a message, tosses coins and sends out a message. We will assume that each protocol role itself is deterministic. Before giving the formal definition, we give an example of a protocol that will be used to illustrate the protocol syntax and semantics. Example 2.2. We model a simple electronic voting protocol in our formalism. The electronic voting protocol will have 2 voters A and B with public keys pk A and pk B respectively and an election authority (EA) with public key pk EA . The two voters will choose amongst two candidates who will be modeled as public names 0 and 1 in the set Pub \ PublicKeys. The protocol will proceed as follows. Initially, the election authority will generate two private tokens tk A and tk B and send them to A and B encrypted under their respective public keys. These tokens will be used by the voters as proofs of their eligibility. A voter after receiving its token will send its choice to the EA along with its proof of eligibility encrypted under pk EA . The EA, after receiving both the votes and checking their validity, tosses a fair coin. If tails turns up then it outputs A's vote first and then B s vote. The order is reversed if head turns up. The security property that we are interested is that the protocol must respect privacy of votes, i.e., an adversary should not be able to deduce from the results how each voter voted.
• S is a finite set of states,
• s 0 is the initial state,
• ≺ is a strict partial order on S,
and (s, t 1 , µ 1 ) are distinct elements of ∆ then t and t 1 are not unifiable. -If (s, t, µ) ∈ ∆ then the support of µ is finite.
Remark: The condition that if (s, t, µ) and (s, t 1 , µ 1 ) are elements of ∆ then t and t 1 are not unifiable ensures that a role is deterministic.
Notation: For a transition tr = (s, t, µ) ∈ ∆ we denote t as lht(tr) (left-hand term of tr). If the support of µ is (s 1 , t 1 ), . . . , (s n , t n ) and p i = µ((s i , t i )) for each i = 1, . . . , n, then we write tr as
If the p i = 1 n for each i, we will ignore the superscripts and just write
We use vars(tr) for vars(t) ∪ 1≤i≤n vars(t i ). For the role R, we write vars(R) = ∪ tr∈∆ vars(tr). Similarly, we use terms(tr) = {t, t 1 , . . . , t n } and terms(R) = ∪ tr∈∆ terms(tr). We take span(tr) = n and span(R) = max tr∈∆ span(tr). The size of tr is the sum of the sizes of each term t, t i ∈ terms(tr) and the sizes of the numerator and denominator of each p i written in binary. Example 2.4. We show how EA in Example 2.2 can be specified as a role R EA . R EA will have 3 states s 0 ≺ s w ≺ s f . s 0 is the initial state of the protocol, s w is the state in which EA has sent the eligibility token and is waiting for the votes, and s f is the final state of the protocol. There are two protocol transitions:
Here ok is a public name, tk A , tk B are private names and x, z 1 , y, z 2 are variables. Intuitively, x and y are the votes of A and B respectively, and z 1 and z 2 are the nonces used by A and B when sending their votes to the EA. The importance of these nonces will be explained later.
Defintion 2.5. A protocol P with n roles is a tuple (ϕ 0 , R 1 , . . . , R n ) such that ϕ 0 is a frame and
In a protocol P = (ϕ 0 , R 1 , . . . , R n ), ϕ 0 models the initial knowledge the adversary has and R 1 , . . . , R n model the different roles executing the protocol P. 
Here tk is a variable and n A is a private name used by A. We can similarly define the roles R We assume that the attacker has a private/public key pair, sk O /pk O . The scenario when A votes for v A and B votes for v B can be described as a protocol
with three roles and the initial frame containing the knowledge sk O .
Remark: In order to model multiple sessions of the same protocol, we will model a principal's action in one session as a separate role.
Protocol semantics
The semantics of a protocol will be defined using Partially Observable Markov Decision Processes (POMDP)s. We begin by recalling some standard notions from Markov Chains and POMDPs.
Discrete-time Markov Chains (DTMCs)
A DTMC is used to model systems which exhibit probabilistic behavior. Formally, a DTMC is a tuple M = (Z, z s , ∆) where Z is a countable set of states, z s the initial state and ∆ : Z → Dist(Z) is a (partial) function which is called the transition function and which maps Z to a (discrete) probability distribution over Z. We say that enabled(z) is true iff ∆(z) is defined. Informally, the process modeled by M evolves as follows. The process starts in the state z s . After i execution steps, if the process is in the state z, the process moves to state z at execution step (i + 1) with probability ∆(z)(z ).
An execution ρ of M of length m is a sequence
For an execution ρ, as given above, we say last(ρ) = z m . The measure of the execution ρ is said to be the product
The set of all executions of M will be denoted by Exec(M). For each Markov chain M that we will construct, there is a bound L M such that the length of each execution in
An execution ρ 1 is said to be a one-step extension of the
In this case, we say that ρ 1 extends ρ by z m+1 . We will say that an execution ρ is maximal if ρ does not have any one-step extension. Notice that the set of all executions of M forms a labeled tree T M whose root node is z s . Each node in this tree is an execution of M. For the tree T M , we take the label of a node ρ to be last(ρ).
Partially Observable Markov Decision Processes (POMDPs)
POMDPs are used to model processes which exhibit both probabilistic and non-deterministic behavior, where the states of the system are only partially observable. Formally, a POMDP is a tuple M = (Z, z s , Act, ∆, O, Obs) where Z is a countable set of states, z s ∈ Z is the initial state, Act is a (countable) set of actions, ∆ : Z × Act → Dist(Z) is a partial function called the probabilistic transition relation, O is a set of observations and Obs : Z → O is a function called the observation function that maps each state to an observation. As a matter of notation, we will write z α − → µ whenever ∆(z, α) = µ. Furthermore, we say that enabled(z, α) is true iff ∆(z, α) is defined. A POMDP is like a Markov Chain except that at each state z, there is a choice amongst several possible probabilistic transitions. The choice of which probabilistic transition to trigger is resolved by an adversary. Informally, the process modeled by M evolves as follows. The process starts in the state z s . After i execution steps, if the process is in the state z, then the adversary chooses an action α with probability p α such that z 
Given an execution ρ = z 0
Observe that view(ρ) is an element of V. As discussed above, the choice of which transition to take in an execution is resolved by an adversary. Formally, an adversary is a function A : V → Dist(Act). An adversary A resolves all non-determinism and the resulting behavior can be described by a DTMC
where is a special symbol. ∆ A ((α, )) is undefined for each α ∈ Act. For each ρ ∈ Exec(M), ∆ A (ρ) is the unique discrete distribution that satisfies the following:
is such that ζ i ∈ Exec(M) for each i < m. ζ m is either an element in Exec(M) or a state (α, ) for some α ∈ Act. Furthermore κ is maximal if and only if ζ m is (α, ) for some α ∈ Act. State-Based Safety properties. Given a POMDP M = (Z, z s , Act, ∆, O, Obs), a set Ψ ⊆ Z is said to be a statebased safety property. An execution ρ = z 0
We say M satisfies Ψ with probability ≥ p against the adversary A (written M A |= p Ψ) if the sum of the measures of executions in the set {κ ∈ (Exec(M A )) | κ is maximal and κ |= Ψ} in the DTMC M A is ≥ p. We say that M satisfies Ψ with
This definition means that we are treating (α, ) as safe iff α is safe for our purposes.
V∪(V·(Act×{ })) and an adversaryA, the probability of A observing o, written pr M (o, A), is the sum of the measures of executions in the set {κ ∈ (Exec(M A )) | view(κ) = o}. Given two POMDPs M = (Z, z s , Act, ∆, O, Obs) and M = (Z , z s , Act, ∆ , O, Obs ) with the same set of actions and observations, we say that M and M are distinguishable by an adversaryA if there is an o ∈ V ∪(V ·(Act× { })) such that pr M (o, A) = pr M (o, A). We say that M and M are indistinguishable if they cannot be distinguished by any attacker. The following proposition states that it suffices to consider only o ∈ V for indistinguishability.
Pure Adversaries. An adversary A : V → Dist(Act) is said to be pure if for each o ∈ V, A(o)(α) is non-zero for exactly one α ∈ Act. It turns out that it suffices to consider only pure adversaries for safety and indistinguishability properties. Intuitively, an adversary does not gain by tossing coins as it can always choose to do the worst-possible action. For the rest of the paper, we will assume that all of our adversaries are pure and we will confuse M A by M A alive . Note that a pure adversary A can also be uniquely identified by the function A pure from V to Act such that for each o, A pure (o) = α where α is the action such that A(o)(α) = 1. Thus, in the rest of the paper, we will consider a pure adversary to be a function from V to Act. Also observe that as defined above, the measure of an execution κ ∈ Exec(M A ) is exactly the measure of the execution last(κ) ∈ Exec(M) where the measure of the execution
Semantics
The semantics of the protocol P is given in terms of a POMDP M P . A state of the POMDP M P consists of a state s i of each role, a ground substitution σ that maps variables in the protocol to ground terms, the frame ϕ that models the messages that have been received by the adversary, the message received from the adversary before the current state was entered, and the message sent out by the protocol role just before transitioning to the current state. The actions of the POMDP M P model the actions of the adversary. In an action, the adversary chooses which role will move next and also constructs (using its frame) the message that is sent to that role. The role accepts a message from the adversary only if the message is valid and matches one of the left hand sides of one of its rules. Defintion 3.3. The semantics of the protocol P = (ϕ 0 , R 1 , R 2 , . . . R n ) with s 0 i as the initial state of R i is given in terms of a POMDP M P = (Z, z s , Act, ∆, F rames/ ∼, Obs) where ((s 1 , s 2 , . . . s n ), σ, ϕ, ) | s i is a state of R i , σ a ground substitution, ϕ a frame and is an element in the set { } ∪ (CT erms × CT erms)}.
• Act = {1, 2, . . . , n} × Recipes. • For a state z = ((s 1 , s 2 , . . . s n ), σ, ϕ, ) ∈ Z and an action α = (i, r), the transition ∆(z, (i, r)) is defined iff there is a transition tr given as
of R i and a ground term t such that
-ϕ r t and -t is valid and unifiable with t i σ.
If defined, let tr be the unique transition as given above (uniqueness follows from the fact that R i is deterministic) and t be the term as given above. Let σ = σ ∪ mgu(t, t i σ).
is the unique probability distribution such that for a state z = ((s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s i−1 , s j , s i+1 , . . . s n ), σ , ϕ nf(t j σ ), (t i , t j )), (where [s j : t j ] is one of the options on the right hand side of tr) ∆(z, α)(z ) = p j (where p j is the probability for option [s j : t j ] in tr).
• The set of observations is F rames/∼, the set of equivalence classes of the set of frames under static equivalence.
• Obs (((s 1 , s 2 , . . . s n ), σ, ϕ, )) = ϕ/∼.
Remark: Since all our substitutions are in normal form and t is a valid ground term, it follows that σ is also a valid substitution in the above definition.
We now define the secrecy and indistinguishability decision problems. For a protocol P with n roles, the size of P is defined to be the sum of sizes of each term in the initial frame, the number of states in each role and the sizes of each transition tr of P . Defintion 3.4. Given a protocol P, a name sec ∈ Prv and a state z = ((s 1 , s 2 , . . . s n ), σ, ϕ, ) of M P , consider the state-based secrecy property Secret(sec) defined as follows: z |= Secret(sec) iff there is no recipe r such that ϕ r sec. Given a rational threshold p, a protocol P, a name sec ∈ Prv, P keeps sec secret with probability at least p (written P |= p Secret(sec)) if M P |= p Secret(sec). The secrecy problem is, given a protocol P , a secret sec ∈ Prv and a probability value p, determine if M P |= p Secret(sec).
Defintion 3.5. Given protocols P and P with n roles each, P and P are said to be indistinguishable if the POMDPs M P and M P are indistinguishable. The indistinguishability problem is, given two protocol P and P , determine if P and P are indistinguishable. [18] ). We highlight two things. First, observe that if the result of coin tosses was made public then P (0, 1) will be distinguishable from P (1, 0). Essentially, if the coin toss had resulted in tails then the attacker will distinguish the two protocols by test whether the first vote output is 0. This test will succeed in the protocol P (0, 1) and fail in the protocol P (1, 0), revealing A's vote. Second, attaching secret names to votes protects vote privacy even if the eligibility tokens are made public after the protocol finishes. For example, if the adversary learns tk A and votes did not have nonces then the adversary will be able to check whether aenc(pk A , [tk A , 0]) matches the vote sent by A to reveal the vote of A.
Simple adversaries
In order to establish the decidability results, we show that if a protocol is not secure then there is an attack of bounded size. The bounded attack that we construct is going to be a simple attack, which is an adaptation of the notion of simple attacks in non-randomized protocols [34] to our formalism. In order to define a simple attack, we first define simple executions. An execution is simple if for each term t, the adversary always uses the same recipe whenever it has to construct t. Defintion 3.7. Given a protocol P and an execution ρ =
of the POMDP M P , we say that ρ is simple if for any two recipes r and r such that r is a subterm of r i for some 0 ≤ i ≤ m−1 and r is a subterm of r j for some 0 ≤ j ≤ m − 1, rϕ i = R r ϕ j ⇒ r = r . Furthermore, if P and P are two protocols such that P and P are distinguishable then there is an adversary A, simple for both P and P , such that the POMDPs M P and M P are distinguishable by A.
An adversary

Decidability proof
We now establish that the secrecy and indistinguishability problems are decidable in coNEXPTIME. We start by showing that the secrecy problem is decidable in coNEXPTIME by proving that the non-secrecy problem is in NEXPTIME; the non-secrecy problem is the one where one needs to determine that P does not keep the secret sec with probability at least p. This is done showing the boundedness property: if P does not keep the secret with probability at least p then there is a bound b, exponential in the size of the protocol, and a simple adversary A such that M A P |= p sec and A only uses recipes whose dag-size is bounded by b.
Proof strategy. We recall the strategy used in [15] to prove that the non-secrecy problem in non-randomized protocols is decidable in NP. The proof proceeds by bounding the size of the smallest attack, if one exists. In case of a nonrandomized protocol P , the tree T M A P for an adversary A has a single branch. Thus, there is at most one value assigned to each variable x in T M A P . Let σ denote the substitution that maps each variable to the value assigned to it. We say that t is a subterm of P if it occurs either in the initial frame or the lefthand side or the right hand side of a transition or if it is a public name. The proof in [15] relies on the key observation that in the smallest attack, for each variable x there is a t ∈ CT erms \ X which is a subterm of P such that σ(x) = tσ. As the number of subterms of a protocol P is polynomial, this implies that the messages sent by the adversary and the recipes used by the adversary to construct those messages have a polynomial dag-size. Thus, the whole attack can be represented by the tree T M A P which is polynomial in the size of the protocol. The NP procedure then guesses this attack.
A natural extension of this strategy for randomized protocols would be to show that the value of a variable x at some node of T M A P is the same as the value of a nonvariable subterm t of P at some other node (note that values of variables and terms can be different in different branches). We show that this observation fails for randomized protocols due to the fact that the adversary has to use the same recipe in executions that have the same view. Here m 0 , m 1 and m 2 are pairwise distinct public names and key, sec are private names. There is a (unique) attack on P that reveals the secret sec with probability 1. The attack initially sends the public name m 0 . As a result, the role R may land in two different states each with probability 1 2 . Note that these two states are indistinguishable. Hence the adversary has to use the same recipe in both branches to send the next message. The adversary uses the recipe [w 1 , w 1 ] to send the next message. The secret sec is now revealed with probability 1, x gets the value m 1 in one branch and z gets the value [senc(key, m 2 ), senc(key, m 2 )] in the other branch. Observe that the value of the variable z is not the value of a non-variable subterm of P .
In our strategy for randomized protocols detailed below, we show that there is a simple attack such that if the adversary uses a recipe r to send a message in an execution ρ then for any r 1 r such that r 1 is not a public name or a variable, there must be an execution ρ in which the term deduced by r 1 matches the value of a term t ∈ CT erms\X of the protocol in some branch of the attack tree. This is achieved by showing that if there is a recipe r 1 which does not satisfy this property then we can replace r 1 with a fresh public name new and get a new attack. A combinatorial argument is then used to establish that this implies that the dag-size of r must be exponentially bounded.
Boundedness Result. We first define the notion of a recipe size of an adversary A. Defintion 4.2. The recipe-size of a recipe r, denoted rsize(r), is the dag-size of r. Given a protocol P and adversary A for P, we say that a recipe r is used by A if there is an execution ρ of the DTMC M A P such that last action(last(ρ)) = (i, r) for some role name i. The recipe-size of A, rsize(A) is defined to be the quantity max {rsize(r) | r is used by A}. Theorem 4.3. Let P = (ϕ 0 , R 1 , R 2 , . . . R n ) and let sec ∈ Prv. Let λ be the total number of transitions in the protocol. Let γ be the total number of transitions in the protocol whose span is > 1. Let η = max {span(R i )|1 ≤ i ≤ n}. Let θ be the cardinality of the set subterms(P ) = Sub(ran(ϕ)) ∪ (∪ 1≤i≤n Sub(terms(R i ))). If P |= p Secret(sec) then there is a simple adversary A such that M A P |= p Secret(sec) and such that rsize(A) ≤ 3θλη 2γ .
Proof: Recall that the POMDP M P denotes the semantics of the protocol P . For a given adversary A, the behavior of the protocol P with respect to the adversary is given by the DTMC M A P . The actions of the adversary A are pairs of the form (i, r) where 1 ≤ i ≤ n is a role name and r is a recipe. The nodes/states of the DTMC are executions of M P and its transitions are one-step extensions obtained by using the action specified by the A. Every transition advances the state of a role. So a transition cannot be triggered twice in the same execution. As a consequence, the DTMC is a finite tree whose height is bounded by, λ, the total number of transitions in the protocol. Any path in the tree has at most γ nodes who have more than one child. Furthermore, each such node has at most η children where η be the maximum of spans of each role R i . Thus, the total number of branches in the tree is bounded by η γ and hence the size of the tree is bounded by λη γ . Assume now that P does not keep sec secret with probability at least p. Let M P = (Z, z s , Act, ∆, O, Obs) where its components Z, z s , Act, ∆, O, Obs are as given in Section 2. This means that there is a simple adversary A such that M A P |= p sec. Now consider the DTMC M A P . Recall that each state of M A P is a simple execution ρ of M P which is a finite sequence z 0
where each node is uniquely labeled by a simple execution of M P . For a node n labeled by ρ, as given above, its children are all labeled one step extensions z 0
Furthermore, we will say prev(ρ) is the execution ρ m−1 . Observe that the execution prev(ρ) is the label of the parent of n. Also, recall that, for ρ as given above, last(ρ) is defined as the state z m .
For the execution ρ as given above, let α i = (k i , r i ) for each 0 ≤ i ≤ m − 1. We say that Recipes(ρ) = {r i | 0 ≤ i ≤ m − 1}. We will say that a recipe r originates at ρ if r r m−1 and r r i for any 0 ≤ i < m − 1. Observe that if r originates at ρ then it does not originate at a state that labels a proper ancestor or proper descendant of n. Furthermore, if r originates at ρ then it also originates at any execution ρ such that view(prev(ρ )) = view(prev(ρ)) and ρ labels some node in the tree T M A P . Consider the execution ρ labeling node n as above and let r be a recipe originating at ρ. Given a term t ∈ subterms(P )\X and executions ρ 1 , ρ 2 such that ρ 1 and ρ 2 label some nodes in The proof of Lemma 4.5 is technical and non-trivial, and can be found in [18] . The key idea in the proof is that if A is not a small adversary then there must be a non-atomic recipe r 0 , an execution ρ 0 labeling a node in the tree T M A P such that r 0 originates at ρ 0 and is not a (ρ, t, ρ )-match for any ρ, ρ , t.
In such a case, we can obtain a new adversary A new by replacing r 0 by a fresh public name new in ρ 0 , any execution ρ with the same view as ρ 0 and all their of their subsequent extensions. The difficulty lies in establishing that A new is a valid adversary and that it violates the safety property. In particular, we have to show that if two executions ρ and ρ are distinguishable in the old attack then their corresponding executions in the new attack are also distinguishable. Since A new has strictly smaller size than A, we can repeat this process until we obtain a small attack. This completes the proof of the Theorem.
Using similar ideas, we can show that we need to only consider bounded size recipes for indistinguishability: Theorem 4.6. Let P and P be two protocols with n roles.
Let λ be the total number of transitions in P and P and γ be the total number of transitions in P and P whose span is > 1. Let η be the maximum span of the transitions of P and P and θ be the total number of subterms of P and P . If P and P are distinguishable then there is a simple adversary A such that M P and M P are distinguishable by A and such that rsize(A) ≤ 12θλη 2γ .
Complexity results. Thanks to the boundedness property and the fact that static equivalence and deducibility can be checked in polynomial time [25] , [24] , we get that the secrecy and indistinguishability problems are in coNEXPTIME for randomized protocols. Essentially, the coNEXPTIME decision procedure guesses a simple attack of bounded size, and checks that this attack violates secrecy/indistiguishability. Theorem 4.7. Secrecy and Indistinguishability problems are in coNEXPTIME.
We say that a protocol P has bounded randomness k if there are at most k transitions of P whose span is greater than one. For each constant k, we define Secrecy(k) to be the decision problem that given a protocol P with bounded randomness k, secret sec and rational number p checks if P |= p Secret(sec). Similarly, Indistinguishability(k) problem is the decision problem that given two protocols P and P with bounded randomness k each checks if P and P are indistinguishable. Observe that for each constant k, the number of branches in an attack tree T M A P for a protocol P with bounded randomness k is bounded by a polynomial η k and hence the number of nodes of T M A P is polynomial in the size of P. Theorems 4.3 and 4.3 then imply that the adversary only need to use recipes of polynomial size. This yields the following: Corollary 4.8. For each constant k, Secrecy(k) and Indistinguishability(k) are in coNP.
Lower Bound for Secrecy
One of the key ideas used in establishing the complexity of non-probabilistic protocols, is the observation that if there is an attack that breaches security, then there is one where the adversary is only required to send messages whose size is bounded by a polynomial in the size of the protocol. However, this observation no longer holds for randomized protocols. We illustrate this through the next example. Example 5.1. Consider a protocol P with one role R = (S, s 0 , ≺, δ), with the states S = {s 0 , s 1 , s 2 , s } and ordering s 0 ≺ s 1 ≺ s 2 ≺ s . We assume that the initial frame ϕ 0 is ∅. We assume that k 1 , k 2 ∈ Prv are secret keys unknown to the adversary, and sec ∈ Prv is the secret message that the adversary is trying to discover. We assume that 0, 1 ∈ Pub are public names. The transitions in δ are as follows.
In order for the adversary to get the secret message sec with probability > 3 4 (which will imply that P |= 1 4 Secret(sec)), in the first step, the adversary has to send the message
In this case the adversary succeeds with probability 1. Notice that this message is nothing but a full binary tree of height 2, where each leaf contains a different pair of the public names 0, 1. Thus, the size of this message (even in a dag representation) is the size of the binary tree. The above example can be generalized to force the adversary to send a full binary tree of height linear in the size of the protocol. Once again the protocol has only one role R = (S, s 0 , ≺, δ), where S = {s 0 , s 1 , . . . s n , s } with the ordering s i ≺ s j if i < j and s i ≺ s for all i ∈ {0, 1, . . . n}. We assume k 1 , . . . k n ∈ Prv are secret keys, and transitions are given as follows.
The secret sec is revealed with probability 1 if and only if the adversary sends, as the first message, a full binary tree of height n, where each leaf has different strings (over 0, 1). The size of this message as a dag is 2 n , which is exponential in the size of the protocol. Before concluding this example, we would like to observe that even though the protocol (as described above) keeps its coin tosses private, this is not essential to ensure the need for exponential sized messages. The same initial message would need to be sent even if we considered a modified protocol where in each step the protocol reveals the result of its coin toss in plaintext to the adversary.
We will show that the problem of checking if the security of a randomized protocol can be breached with probability greater than some threshold p, is NEXPTIME-hard. The hardness proof is shown by reducing the satisfiability problem of first-order logic with monadic predicates [16] . Before presenting the reduction, we first introduce the logic. Defintion 5.2. A monadic signature τ is a set of relation symbols of arity one. First order formulas over a monadic signature τ is given by the grammar
where R is a relation symbol in τ and x is a first-order variable.
Notice that = is not allowed in this logic and there are no constant symbols. The satisfiability problem for this logic is known to be NEXPTIME-complete [16] 3 . We will reduce the satisfiability problem of this logic to the nonsecrecy problem as follows. Theorem 5.3. The secrecy problem is coNEXPTIMEhard.
Proof: It suffices to show that given a protocol P , secret sec ∈ Prv, p > 0, the problem of checking if P |= p Secret(sec) is NEXPTIME-hard.
There are 3 key ideas that play a role in establishing this result. The first is an observation due to Rusinowitch and Turuani [15] that shows how the satisfiability of propositional logic can be reduced to protocol insecurity. Given a 3CNF formula ϕ, Rusinowitch-Turuani construct a protocol that proceeds in two phases. First, the adversary guesses a satisfying truth assignment, and sends this to the protocol. The protocol ensures the commitment of the adversary to this assignment for the rest of the execution by encrypting the assignment using a key that is secret. After this phase, the adversary demonstrates the satisfaction of each clause by revealing a relevant portion of the assignment that (s)he committed to in the first step. If all clauses are satisfied, the secret is revealed. The second observation is that randomization can be used to simulate quantifier alternation, with the adversary making existential choices, and the protocol making universal choices by probabilistic steps. Before presenting the NEXPTIME-hardness result, we show a PSPACE-hardness result that shows how these two observations can be combined to reduce QSAT to protocol insecurity of randomized protocols. Consider a QBF ϕ = Q 1 x 1 . Q 2 x 2 . . . . Q n x n . ψ, where Q i ∈ {∃, ∀}, x i is a propositional variable and ψ = ∧ m j=1 C j is a 3CNF formula with clauses C j . The satisfiability of ϕ can be reduced to the insecurity of a protocol P with only one role R. We assume that , ⊥ are public names in Pub standing for true and false, respectively. Keys {k 1 , . . . k n } (one for each propositional variable) are secret names in Prv. For each variable x i , the protocol P has a state g i and for each clause C j , P has a state c j . P has one additional state s . P proceeds in phases. First, a truth assignment for the variables is chosen. The value for variable x i is picked in state g i ; if x i is existentially quantified then the adversary picks the value for x i , and if x i is universally quantified then the protocol picks the value for x i . The transition rules capturing these steps are as follows (with the understanding that g n+1 = c 1 ).
Notice, that when the value of a universally quantified variable is picked, the result of the coin toss is made public so that the adversary's choice for future existential variables may depend on this value. Also, the variables are chosen in the order in which they are quantified in ϕ by the use of states g i . After all variables have been assigned truth values, the clauses in ψ are evaluated in sequence, using states {c 1 , . . . c m }. In each state c j , the adversary sends a (encrypted) truth value of a variable that makes one of the literals in C j true. The rules capturing these steps are as follows (with the understanding that c m+1 = s T ). Observe that, under the assumption that the keys {k i } i are not known to the adversary, ϕ is satisfiable iff sec is obtained with probability 1. If ϕ is not satisfiable then the protocol keeps sec secret with probability at least 1 2 n 1 where n 1 is the number of universal quantifications.
The last ingredient needed in order to prove NEXPTIME-hardness, is the ability of a randomized protocol to "examine" the contents of an exponential sized message. This is accomplished using ideas in the protocol described in Example 5.1. Details of how we combine all these ideas to reduce the satisfaction problem of monadic first-order formulas to the insecurity problem of randomized protocols is given in [18] . One particular feature of the proof is that all coin tosses in the reduction are public. Thus, the NEXPTIME-hardness result holds even for checking the insecurity of randomized protocols where all coin tosses are public.
Conclusions
We have shown that the problem of checking secrecy of randomized security protocols is coNEXPTIMEcomplete, and the problem of checking indistinguishability of two randomized security protocols is in coNEXPTIME. The hardness results for secrecy hold even if we assume that the results of the coin tosses are public. In contrast, it can be shown that for public coin tosses, the indistinguishability problem is coNP-complete. Our results also show that, when the number of coin tosses are bounded, i.e., the number of probabilistic transitions are bounded, both secrecy and indistinguishability are coNPcomplete. Our results are summarized in Table 1 . The model of protocols we considered, allow the cryptographic primitives corresponding to symmetric as well as asymmetric encryption and decryption. It can easily be shown that our results extend to the case when digital signatures and hash functions are also allowed in the protocols. Obtaining tight bounds for the indistinguishability problem needs to be explored as part of future work. The decidability and complexity of the above problems also needs to be investigated for the case when we allow conditional statements in the protocols and for other cryptographic primitives that can be modeled as subterm convergent rewrite systems.
